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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the hypothesis that the stock market overreacted to accounting scandals 
during 2002, resulting in extensive drops in share value followed by return reversals that reveal 
market inefficiencies.  Data are gathered for nine firms directly involved in an accounting 
scandal, as well as the major competitors of those firms.  An empirical test of returns for all thirty-
three firms reveals that an investment strategy of selling short scandal firms and their competitors, 
followed by a contrarian investment strategy of buying those same stocks, resulted in risk-adjusted 
returns well above those expected for a period of one year after the scandal.  These results reveal 
stock market inefficiencies and a potential to realize abnormal returns by capitalizing on investor 
overreaction.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
y the end of 2002, several of America’s most successful businesses had been involved in some kind 
of accounting scandal and were being investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).  Among these companies were WorldCom, Qwest, Xerox, Adelphia, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
and Arthur Andersen. 
 
The effects of misleading accounting are very detrimental to the securities world because knowledgeable 
investors often use fundamental analysis of a company’s financial reports to determine if a stock is valued 
appropriately in the open market.  Based on this analysis, people aim to buy undervalued stock and sell overvalued 
stock.  During the accounting scandals of 2002, investors were suddenly faced with the prospect that financial 
statements may not accurately reflect the company’s standing.   
 
The purpose of this study is to discover whether the accounting scandals created market inefficiencies, thus 
challenging the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  Furthermore, it investigates both contrarian investing and the 
Overreaction Hypothesis by constructing portfolios using various trading strategies and comparing their returns to 
expected risk-adjusted returns.  The central question is: if investors are likely to panic in times of controversy, is it 
possible for a rational observer to make a quick profit from that mass exit from the market?  When investors 
overreact to corporate scandals that receive massive media attention, their behavior will temporarily drive stock 
values below intrinsic value.  If people over-generalize these same scandals, then investors will quickly sell shares 
of firms similar to the company tainted by the recent scandal, regardless of the financial standing of that company.  
The result will be that even the “good” company’s market value will drop.  A potential investment approach to these 
scandals is to sell short the scandal-tainted firm and the stock of the major competitors of that firm to benefit from 
the expected value drop.  Another line of attack is a contrarian strategy, which aims to make a profit by going 
against what the majority of investors are doing.  An outside spectator could buy stock in the “good” companies 
after their prices had fallen due to the scandal of the similar “bad” company.  According to the Overreaction 
Hypothesis, the share value of the “good” company should revert back to its actual value relatively quickly, and the 
contrarian investor should be able to sell the stock for a quick profit.   
 
The first part of the paper presents a summary of the literature related to the relevant theories, especially the 
Overreaction Hypothesis (ORH), the theory of contrarian investing, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  
B 
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The second half of the paper presents the empirical research, including two different strategies, a selling short 
strategy and a contrarian approach.  An analysis of returns over set time intervals is performed for each strategy.  
Actual returns are compared to expected returns to determine whether it was possible to make better-than-expected 
profits using these trading techniques in the aftermath of the many scandals. 
 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
  
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) first proposed the concepts of the Overreaction Hypothesis (ORH) and the 
contrarian investment strategy.  By studying monthly stock returns from 1926 to 1982 for firms traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange, the authors find that companies that previously under performed the market subsequently had 
returns higher than the market average.  Based on this finding they form the contrarian investing strategy of buying 
losers and selling winners.  Their research also shows that investors appear to overreact to unanticipated news 
events, temporarily affecting stock prices.  This study undermines the Efficient Market Hypothesis by providing a 
trading strategy that claims to lead to above average returns and by giving evidence that stock prices do not always 
accurately reflect all public knowledge. 
  
The concept of a price reversal is often seen as support for the ORH.  Benou and Richie (2003), Hirschey 
(2003), and Forbes (1996) all support the existence of predictable price reversals.  Many of these are based on the 
findings of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) that stocks that under perform the market will later provide above average 
returns. Benou and Richie examine several large firms whose stock has experienced a price decline of twenty 
percent or more during a single month.  The study tests for price reversion, and the results support the idea that 
extreme price movements will eventually move back the other way.  Many of the large firms used in the study 
experience positive and statistically significant abnormal returns in the first year following the twenty percent price 
drop.  Benou and Richie claim that investor overreaction leads to the initial price drop, and they attribute the price 
reversal to a market correction meant to bring share value to a more appropriate level.  They suggest that this 
information can be used to form a trading strategy where investors “can profit by buying the stocks of large firms 
that experienced large price declines and holding them six to 12 months following the decline” (p. 37). 
  
Not all studies on overreaction find support for the theory.  Conrad and Gultekin (1997) find that profits 
from a contrarian strategy are due to bid-ask errors in transactions costs.  They conclude that measurement errors in 
previous studies have falsely given the impression of market inefficiency, resulting in the misleading impression that 
contrarian strategies provide above average returns.  Conrad and Kaul (1993) perform a similar study testing for 
contrarian profits and market overreaction.  They find no evidence of market overreaction with this study. 
 
Despite the studies that contest the ORH and contrarian investing, the supporting evidence seems to be 
more extensive and more convincing and has huge implications for the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  All three 
levels of the EMH assert that it is impossible to consistently realize above-normal profits in the stock market.  The 
ORH claims that investor overreaction can be predicted when major, unexpected news events occur.  A contrarian 
investor can then profit, time and again, from that overreaction by acting in a manner opposite to the majority.  This 
strategy undercuts the validity of the EMH. 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis enjoyed great popularity for many years, but evidence from the past 
several decades has begun to challenge the basic tenets of the theory.  The EMH is currently considered by many to 
be “a highly simplified representation of the working of equity markets” (Dissaniake 1997, p. 45).  The EMH does 
not leave any room for human error, assuming that all investors act completely rationally and that there is no way to 
find profits that haven’t already been arbitraged away.  Any time an investor is able to consistently beat the market 
and realize abnormal returns, the theory of efficient markets is contested.  Although markets do appear to be 
relatively efficient, at times inefficiencies leave a temporary window to make abnormal profits.  The current study 
investigates whether the accounting scandals represent one such window. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
 This study proposes that, in response to the many accounting scandals of 2002, investors became skittish 
about future scandals and pulled their money out of any stocks closely related to scandal-tainted firms, in particular 
major competitors of those firms.  The hypothesis investigates whether the share value decrease was only short-term 
for the firms that had the scandal as well as for their competitors.  If this is in fact market overreaction, then a return 
reversal should have quickly followed the initial value drop, revealing an opportunity for attentive investors to 
realize abnormal returns.     
 
This paper tests two different strategies for capitalizing on scandal-related market overreaction.  One 
strategy is to immediately sell short the stocks of scandal firms and their competitors.  This will take advantage of 
the swift price fall that is predicted by the Overreaction Hypothesis (ORH).  This study is unique in that it adds an 
element of over-generalization by examining competitors’ shares as well as the actual scandal firm’s value.  The 
second strategy is a contrarian approach that involves buying scandal firms and their competitors when the price is 
low, one or two months following the scandal announcement, then holding the stocks until six months or one year 
after the scandal.  According to the ORH, the share value should revert back to its appropriate market value soon 
after the overreaction.  Actual returns will be based on the percentage change in closing stock prices from the 
designated buying date until the designated ending date.  These returns will be compared to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model’s predicted return.  
 
DATA 
 
 The nine scandal firms for this study were chosen from the CRS Report for Congress “Accounting 
Problems Reported in Major Companies since Enron.” (Jickling 2003)  The data are comprised of stock prices from 
various dates.  The dates were based on the earliest announcement of an accounting scandal by the “scandal firm.”  
Stocks selected include nine scandal firms and their major competitors, totaling thirty-three firms.  A complete list 
of scandal firms, their major competitors, and the date of the initial scandal announcement can be found in Table 1.   
 
Stock prices for each firm, as well as for the firm’s competitors, were collected based on the date of the 
first announcement regarding accounting misconduct.  Hoover’s Online, which provides investment information and 
data for individual stocks, was used to determine the top competitors for each scandal firm. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
Selling Short Strategy 
 
 Table 2 shows an overall summary of the results for the short selling strategy.  The top row includes the 
nine scandal firms only, and the bottom row is an average of all thirty-three stocks, both scandal firms and 
competitors.  The results after one month show the return realized assuming the stock was sold short two trading 
days after the scandal announcement, and then bought back one month after the selling date.  The two month returns 
are calculated by selling the borrowed stock two trading days after the announcement, and buying it back two 
months later.  Next to each column of actual returns for one and two months is the corresponding expected return, as 
calculated by the CAPM. 
 
 Table 2 shows that returns were smaller for the two-month period, implying that the scandal firms 
experienced the greatest price drop during the first month; after that it appears that the share prices for these firms 
began to go back up.  Overall, all thirty-three firms performed much better than the broader market, as did the 
scandal firms alone. 
   
 The CAPM expected returns are negative because the S&P 500 fell throughout most of 2002-2003.  
Because none of the sample stocks’ betas were negative, it is expected that the stocks will move in the same 
direction as the overall market: if the S&P 500 goes down, the stocks can also be expected to go down.  The 
negative expected returns make the actual positive returns even more significant.  It should be mentioned that since 
the overall market fell, a positive return could have been realized by selling short a market index.  However, the 
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returns would have been minimal and smaller than the returns realized by selling short the scandal firms and their 
competitors.     
 
 
Table 1 Scandal Firms, Top Competitors, and Announcement Date 
Scandal Firm Top Competitors Announcement Date 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMY) Merck & Co. Inc. (MRK) July 11, 2002 
 Novartis AG (NVS)  
 Pfizer Inc. (PFE)  
Dynegy Inc. (DYN) Duke Energy Corp. (DUK) May 9, 2002 
 Exelon Corp. (EXC)  
 The Williams Companies Inc. (WMB)  
Halliburton Co. (HAL) Baker Hughes Inc. (BHI) May 28, 2002 
 Schlumberger Ltd. (SLB)  
 Technip (TKP)  
International Business Electronic Data Systems Corp. (EDS) February 20, 2002 
Machines Corp. (IBM) Hewlett-Packard Co. (HPQ)  
 Microsoft Corp. (MSFT)  
Qwest Communications AT&T Corp. (T) July 10, 2002 
International Inc. (Q) Sprint FON Group (FON)  
The PNC Financial Mellon Financial Corp. (MEL) July 18, 2002 
Services Group (PNC) National City Corp. (NCC)  
 Wachovia Corp. (WB)  
Time Warner Inc. (TWX) Viacom Inc. (VIA) July 24, 2002 
 The Walt Disney Co. (DIS)  
 Yahoo Inc. (YHOO)  
Tyco International Ltd. (TYC) Johnson & Johnson Inc. (JNJ) January 22, 2002 
 Molex Inc. (MOLX)  
Xerox Corp. (XRX) Canon Inc. (CAJ) June 28, 2002 
 Hewlett-Packard Co. (HPQ)   
 
 
Table 2 Returns from Selling Short 
 One Month  
Return 
Monthly 
CAPM 
Two Month  
Return 
Two Month 
CAPM 
Scandal Firms 14.51% -0.38% 6.6% -0.76% 
All Stocks 8.38% -0.3% 11.94% -0.6% 
 
 
Contrarian Strategy 
 
 For the contrarian strategy of buying stocks after the scandal announcement (after share prices have 
presumably been sold off and driven lower), actual returns were computed for a holding period of six months and 
one year after the scandal.  Two buy dates were tested in this strategy, one month after the scandal announcement 
and two months after. The CAPM return was based on the length of the holding period.   
 
Contrarian Approach - Buying One Month After Scandal Announcement 
 
 The results for this approach are shown in Table 3.  The scandal firms in the top row performed much 
better than expected, supporting the hypothesis that the scandal firms, which also realized positive returns in the 
selling short strategy, experienced a significant return reversal.  This reversal was greatest during the first six months 
following the scandal, but returns, although diminishing, continued increasing over one year.  The averages of the 
thirty-three firms also returned better-than-expected profits when compared to the CAPM.  These results suggest 
that return reversal occurred for all firms, although it was greater for the scandal firms. 
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Table 3 Returns from Contrarian Strategy, Buying One Month after Scandal Announcement 
 Holding Until 6 Months 
After Announcement 
5 month CAPM Holding Until 1 Year 
After Announcement 
11 Month CAPM 
Scandal Firms 36.27% -0.19% 44.69% -0.42% 
All Stocks 17.11% -1.5% 25.8% -3.3% 
 
 
Contrarian Approach - Buying Two Months after Scandal Announcement 
 
 The returns for the contrarian approach of buying the selected stocks two months after the scandal 
announcement, then holding them for six months and one year, are shown in Table 4.  The scandal firms in the top 
row under-performed their CAPM for the holding period of six months and a buy date of two months after the 
announcement.  However, this portfolio then produced better-than-expected profits over one year.   
 
 
Table 4 Returns from Contrarian Strategy, Buying Two Months after Scandal Announcement 
 Holding Until 6 Months 
After Announcement 
4 month CAPM Holding Until 1 Year 
After Announcement 
10 Month CAPM 
Scandal Firms -1.17% -1.5% 15.28% -3.8% 
All Stocks 7.47% -1.2% 20.32% -3% 
 
 
Finally, combining the selling short and contrarian approaches results in a very profitable trading strategy.  
Selling all thirty-three firms short for one month immediately following the initial scandal would have provided a 
return of 8.38%.  Then buying those same firms one month after the scandal announcement and holding them until 
one year after the announcement could have provided a 25.8% return.  This combined strategy gives an annual 
return of 34.18%, quite impressive compared to the expected annual return of –3.6%.  If an investor were to deal 
only in scandal firms, since they are predicted to experience even greater price swings due to overreaction and return 
reversal, an annual return of 59.2% was possible by selling the scandal stocks short for one month, then buying these 
stocks and holding for one year.  This significantly exceeded the expected return of –4.56%.    
 
It appears that, based on the raw data without removing any outliers, the market did overreact during the 
month immediately following the scandal announcement.  Selling short scandal firms and their competitors provided 
positive returns during a bear market.  Those firms appeared to reverse their price movement, and many of them 
experienced positive price changes over six months and one year following the scandal announcement.  These 
results support the hypothesis proposed by this paper.  Still, a couple of firms had very extreme price changes and 
these outliers may have skewed the returns.  The same computations were performed without these firms, and the 
highlights of those tests are discussed in the following section. 
 
Adjusting for Outliers 
 
 The cut-off point for outliers was determined to be a 75% price change at any time during the study period.  
This number is actually quite high for the average market, but since this test is studying investor overreaction, 
several high-volatility stocks, and an abnormal period in stock market history, this trigger point, though arbitrary, 
was deemed acceptable.  A stock that showed a 75% price change for any one of the many calculations was removed 
from the data for all return periods, both before the 75% change as well as after it.  Six stocks experienced a 75% or 
greater change. 
 
Table 5 shows the returns from the two different strategies.  Directly below the returns for the scandal firms 
and returns for all twenty-seven stocks are the CAPM expected returns for the corresponding time period.  This chart 
shows that, although returns were smaller without the outliers, most of them were still greater than the expected risk-
adjusted return.   
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Table 5 Returns Adjusted for Outliers 
 Selling Short Contrarian Strategy   
      Buy date 1 
month after 
scandal 
 Buy Date 2 
Months after 
scandal 
 
Holding Period 1 Month 2 Months 6 Months 1 Year 6 Months 1 Year 
Scandal Firms 3.32% 2.87% -7.35% 8.59% 0.73% 8.65% 
CAPM For Scandal Firms -0.42% -0.83% -2.08% -4.58% -1.67% -4.17% 
Average of all 27 firms 3.36% 10.62% -0.67% 7.39% -1.33% 13.24% 
CAPM for all firms -0.28% -0.56% -1.39% -3.06% -1.11% -2.78% 
 
 
Selling Short 
 
 Both the scandal firms alone and all twenty-seven firms together returned greater-than-expected profits 
with the selling short strategy.  The returns for the scandal firms were greatest over the first month, which supports 
the results found in earlier sections.  This implies that market overreaction to the scandal firms was greatest during 
the first month immediately following the scandal announcement.  Interestingly, returns for all twenty-seven firms 
combined were much higher over a two-month selling short period.  This may indicate that investors did not 
overreact immediately for the competitors of scandal firms, but instead hesitated, then sold off competitors’ shares, 
driving prices down for a period of at least two months.  Whatever the reason, the opportunity to realize abnormal 
profits by selling short scandal firms and their competitors did exist during 2002.  Although profits were smaller 
without the outliers, the returns for the selling short strategy continued to support the hypothesis. 
 
Contrarian Strategy 
 
 Results from the contrarian trading approach show that stock prices did experience a return reversal.  This 
reversal was much more pronounced with a holding period until one year after the scandal than with a holding 
period through six months after, regardless of whether the stocks were bought one or two months following the 
announcement.  Although returns were not as great once the study was adjusted for outliers, both showed more 
significant returns with a longer holding period.  The scandal firms alone and the twenty-seven stocks together 
provided positive returns for a one-year holding period, but in both cases returns were negative over the six-month 
holding period.  This indicates that share prices were still depressed after six months but began to rebound at some 
point between six months and one year after the scandal announcement. 
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to definitely conclude based on these tests whether the short-term depressed 
share prices show market overreaction or simply reflect the bear market.  Regardless, returns for the scandal firms 
alone and all twenty-seven stocks over a one-year holding period are much greater than expected.  These stocks 
managed to realize positive returns while the broader market was negative.  By combining the selling short strategy 
and the contrarian strategy, returns of at least 10% were possible when the portfolio was held until one year 
following the scandal, no matter which stocks were bought (scandal firms vs. scandal firms and competitors) and no 
matter how long the stocks were sold short (one month or two months).  This is impressive considering that the 
expected rate of return was –5.04% for the scandal firms and –3.36 for all twenty-seven firms.  
  
Overall, the returns when adjusted for outliers were similar to those that included the outliers.  The second 
running of the data revealed that the share prices stayed down for longer than six months.  Based on the results of 
this empirical study, the best trading strategy in response to scandal announcements appears to be one where the 
investor sells short the stock of scandal companies and their major competitors for two months.  After those two 
months, the investor can form a portfolio with the same stocks they sold short and hold them until one year 
following the initial scandal announcement.  If stocks react to future scandals in the same way they reacted during 
2002, then abnormal returns are possible.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper has presented the hypothesis that the stock market overreacted to the accounting scandals of 
2002, resulting in extensive decreases in share value among the scandal firms as well as their competitors.  The 
theoretical foundation for this hypothesis lies in the Overreaction Hypothesis and the impact of investor psychology 
on financial markets.  An empirical test of returns reveals that a strategy of selling short the scandal firms and their 
competitors, followed by a contrarian investment strategy of buying those same stocks, results in returns that were 
well above those expected for a period of one year after the scandal.  The observed returns support the proposed 
hypothesis, exposing temporary market inefficiencies.  Investors overreacted and over-generalized by selling shares 
of the competitors of scandal-tainted firms, perhaps intending to limit risk.  Over the year following the initial 
scandal announcement, however, the overreaction was reversed, and positive returns were realized for the majority 
of firms included in this study.  These findings support the Overreaction Hypothesis and refute the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. 
 
This paper has attempted to introduce a trading strategy that capitalizes on investor psychology and might 
be useful in response to future negative announcements.  It is important to note that the market does become 
desensitized, and the market response from 2002 may not occur again, even if all the same factors were to repeat 
themselves.  The corporate dishonesty of 2002 was shown through an overwhelming number of scandals, which 
undoubtedly caused increased risk awareness and heightened investor worries about additional problems.  In the 
end, though, the stock market was not affected that greatly (although it did lose a few major players, such as Enron 
and WorldCom), and the fact that the market recovered is what investors will ultimately remember.  If similar 
scandals happen in the future, investor reactions to them might not be as great.  Even so, this study does reveal 
market inefficiencies and supports the power of investor psychology.  There will always be major events in the 
future that lead to overreaction.  It appears that using the strategies of selling short and contrarian investing in 
response to those negative news events may result in abnormal positive returns.   
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